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Abstract 
The detection and prevention of hazard is the focus of software safety. It helps safety personnel to eliminate hazard 
and find unknown hazard through the research on the classification of software hazard. The current situation of 
software hazard and concepts are first introduced in this paper. And then software hazard classification is presented 
from three aspects which based on the structure, system and process. This paper provides a new good way to solve 
software safety testing and testing requirements analysis from the angle of reuse and efficiency. 
 
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
 
Keywords: hazard; software hazard; software safety; classification; testing requirements 
1. Introduction 
Software hazard often is the focus of software quality and the test. Its risk should be as less as possible 
for high quality software, But software does not exist by itself. It operates in an electronic system 
(computer) and often controls other hardware. Software is hazardous if it can directly lead to a hazard or 
is used to control a hazard [1]. For safety critical software to carry out the classification of software hazard 
and to control hazard and improve software safety is essential to the software quality.  
Software hazard is closely related to software failure mode and system hazard. But Software failure 
mode does not necessarily lead to danger. Software hazard does not necessarily belong to software failure 
mode. The result of software hazard shows the system hazard. System hazard does not necessarily result 
in software hazard. Software failure mode includes function failure and performance failure, and it is 
mainly function failure. According to GB/T11457-2006[8], three states that software failure modes have is 
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pointed out macroscopically. Software failure mode is divided from the angle of the program running into 
five kinds in [9]. They are system haltedǃthe running speed does not matchǃ calculation accuracy is not 
enoughǃ output item defects and output items are redundant. Software failure modes are divided into 
general failure mode and detailed failure mode in GJB/Z1391-2006[10]. The classification is only from the 
angle of input/output/operation and coverage is not comprehensive. System hazard is mainly from 
hardware. The typical system is given from the view of time in GJB/Z1391-2006 [10]. The above 
classification cannot effectively guide the software safety testing and testing requirements analysis.  
At present, there lacks of study of software hazard classification. Software hazard classification was 
first put out in this paper, its classification performed innovatively from three aspects, and made up for the 
lack of this research field. In this paper, the classification of software hazard fully covered the safety 
elements, and it had very good extensibility. To carry out the research of safety testing on the basis of 
classification can effectively guide software safety design (safety requirements design, safety coding 
design). And it was conducive to the tester to perform software safety testing more fully, and to ensure the 
safety of airborne software.  
 
Nomenclature 
 
A  hazard 
               The presence of a potential risk situation caused by an unsafe act or condition. A 
condition or changing set of circumstances that presents a potential for adverse or 
harmful consequences; or the inherent characteristics of any activity, condition or 
circumstance which can produce adverse or harmful consequences[1]. 
B  software hazard 
               Software hazard is leaded by the wrong control of software to hardware. The software 
can run correctly (according to its requirements), may also appear in some failure 
mode[1]. 
2. The Classification of Standard 
Classification of software failure modes and system hazard was give as below:  
Table 1. The classification of standard 
standard classification 
GB/T11457—2006 
Functional unit loses the ability performed by its function 
Systems and system components lost the ability perform the required function within the 
prescribed limit, 
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Program operation deviated from the requirements 
GJB/Z1391—2006 
Software failure 
mode 
Common failure modes 
Runtime does not conform to the 
requirements,  input is not in conformity with 
the requirements, the output is not in 
conformity with the requirements 
Detailed failure mode 
Input/output failure, program failure, do not 
meet the function and performance 
requirements and others 
System hazard 
Work ahead 
not work within the prescribed period of time  
Work within the prescribed non-working time 
intermittent work or unstable 
Output disappear or faults in the work 
Software failure modes and effects 
analysis to study 
system halted, software stop outputting 
Speed does not match: the speed of data reception or output does not accord with the 
demand of the system 
Calculation accuracy is not enough˖ The calculation precision of one or some of the output 
parameter values don't meet requirement due to the amount of data acquisition insufficient 
or algorithm problems 
Output item defects: lack of some necessary output values 
Output is redundant: output of the system software is not the desired data/instruction 
3. Software Hazard Classification 
Extensive research was conducted in this paper by consulting literature and standard. Software hazards 
were collected. And then they were classified reasonably to ensure the safety classification cover software 
elements comprehensively. 
The guiding principle of software hazard classification is: 1) to cover possible danger greatest; 2) to 
use the existing experience greatest; 3) to avoid conflict and repeat between classification; 4) be benefit to 
expansion of the classification; 5) to perform safety testing requirements analysis efficiently and 
sufficiently. 
The purpose of software hazard classification is: 1) to provide a useful and consistent software hazard 
classification method; 2) to provide structural way for finding new software hazard to do safety testing 
requirements analysis; 3) to help software testers to implement the software safety testing better. 
In this paper, software hazard was classified based on the software structure, the types of software 
system, software process three aspects as shown in figure 1. 
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Fig. 1. software hazard preliminary classification 
Software hazard classification is introduced specifically below. 
3.1. Software hazard category based on structure 
Software hazard based on the structure is divided into embedded and not embedded software hazard. 
Embedded system composition and airborne software requirements specification was analyzed. And the 
existing classification of software safety requirements, source of hazard classification, safety strategy and 
embedded system elements were take example. The main elements involved in the airborne embedded 
software include: initialize, interface, input, output, control, fault detection, fault handle, performance, etc. 
Then each part were realized to get hazard associated with software system. As shown in figure 2. 
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Fig. 2. software hazard category based on structure 
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Dangerous pattern caused by software failure modes was covered by the classification based on the 
structure. But it was not limited to this. The classification covered more comprehensive. Each part are 
realized to get hazard associated with software. As shown in table 2 
. Table 2. Software hazard example based on the structure 
System elements The corresponding hazard Detailed hazard 
Initialize Initialize hazard 
Electricity self-inspection replaceable unit is used for multiple processes 
Electricity self-inspection end in dangerous state 
Initialization or start to unsafe condition 
Power on dangerous state 
Interlock fails operation 
Internal software pattern could not be updated in real time 
Power fluctuate or failure 
Power up Did not detect 
Degraded mode of function last too long 
Initialization is not reasonable 
Input Input constraints hazard  
Tested variable is not used 
Monitoring variable values has no response operation  
Test variables beyond use 
Input hasn't been attained minimum rate 
Input arrival rate exceed input ability 
Test variables don’t provided valid time 
There have no response spontaneous collect test variables  
There is not specified abnormal operation during the period of delay 
Input and output is not for testing 
The determination of the sampling frequency is not comprehensive 
Data resources of acquisition are not clear 
Safety-critical data acquisition don’t conduct redundancy design 
…… …… …… 
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3.2. Software hazard category based on system 
Software hazard category based on system include: engine control system software, landing gear 
control system software, brake control system software, flight control system software, power supply 
system software, etc. Then corresponding software hazard was given for each system. 
First work state or flight stage of hazard was determined. According to the practice of civil aviation, 
work state or flight phases were as follows in AC 25.1309ü1A. 
Ground: G1 ground glide; G2 plane still; G3 maintain. 
Take off: T1 take-off slide (before lift the front wheel); T2 take off (after lift the front wheel); T3 
break off  in air. 
Flight: F1 climb; F2 pack up the landing gear; F3 put down the landing gear; F4 cruise; F5 touch down; 
F6 enter the airfield; F7 go around; F8 200 feet to the landing; F9others. 
Land: L1 landing runway; L2 brake with reverse thrust. 
Then it conducted detailed analysis for each system or each stage to get relevant software hazard. 
Typical hazard of each system is given as shown in table 3. 
Table 3. The corresponding table of danger and flight  phase 
No System Hazard of System characterization Flight phase 
1 
Engine control system 
software 
hoveringǃflameout in flightǃThe air start is not successful F1~F9 
Over temperature ǃ overpressure ǃ surge ǃ excess revolutions ǃ
aerodynamic stall 
G1ǃ T1ǃ T2ǃ T3ǃ
F1~F8ǃL1ǃL2 
2 
Landing gear control 
system software 
The function of control gear is lost G1ǃT1ǃT2ǃL1 
The control function of main landing gear is asymmetric T1ǃL1 
3 
Brake control system 
software 
tire burst˄landing with brakesǃslip˅ǃweak brakeǃrush out the 
runwayǃfalse-alarmǃthe brake wobble˄slip frequencyǃthe brake is 
too hard˅ǃwalk 
G1ǃL1ǃL2 
4 
Flight control system 
software 
The boundary condition˄Pitching Angle is too largeǃoverloadǃ
Speed/small Mach number is too largeǃAngle of attack is too bigǃtilt 
angle is too largeǃThe rudder trip is too large ˅ǃ redundancy 
management failureǃFlight control is in abnormal work mode 
G1ǃ T1ǃ T2ǃ T3ǃ
F1~F8ǃL1ǃL2 
The air start failure F1~F9 
5 
Power supply system 
software 
Power voltage over the steady voltage limitǃNo power supply or 
voltage instabilityǃmomentary power failure 
G1ǃ T1ǃ T2ǃ T3ǃ
F1~F8ǃL1ǃL2 
Then FTA was used to decompose hazard specifically to guide the software safety testing and testing 
requirement analysis.  
3.3. Software hazard classification based on process 
Software hazard classification based on the process included: development phase, operation phase, 
maintenance phase. Then software hazard was gave from these different phase. As shown in table 4. 
Table 4. Software hazard classification based on the process 
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Software process Software hazard 
Development phase 
Requirement phase 
Requirement is not correct 
Requirement is not complete 
Requirement  is not consistent 
Design phase 
Input and output timing 
Multi-event  
Not according to the sequence of events 
The failure of the event 
Error events 
Inappropriate quantity 
Incorrect extreme value 
Adverse environmental 
The deadlock of multitasking system 
Hardware failure 
Coding Phase 
Logic errors of code 
Data error of code 
Code interface is not compatible 
The code effect that not be used 
Operation phase 
Inappropriate control behavior 
Control behavior execute Improperly 
Feedback improperly or missing 
Maintenance phase 
Improper maintenance  
External invasion 
Software hazard classification of the operational phase based on control defects put forward by Nancy. 
It focused on abnormal running environment, abnormal personnel operation, abnormal cross linking 
system. It provides software safety testing with complete general test requirements to ensure the adequacy 
of safety testing. 
4. Summarize 
In this paper, we research on software hazard. And it puts out detailed classification of software hazard 
based on structure, system, process. It provides a new good way to analyze safety requirements. And it 
can guide software safety design and testing more effectively. Software hazard classification will be 
added and perfected in the follow-up work, and perfect safety testing requirements will be put forward. 
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